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I. STATEMENTOFTHECASE

Respondent offers the following statement of this case to the extent that it disagrees with
or supplements the history offered by the Appellants, pursuant to Rule 35(b)(3) of the Idaho
Appellate Rules.

A. Nature of the Case
The nature of this matter revolves around Appellants' claim for attorney fees in an
arbitration proceeding. Appellants, Sam and Deva Ferrell ("Ferrells"), filed an uninsured
motorist claim pursuant to their commercial auto policy. The policy was issued by United
Financial Casualty Company ("United Financial"). United Financial settled and paid all of the
claims submitted by the Ferrells with the exception of the wage loss claim prior to the initiation
of arbitration. The lost wage claim was disputed. The Ferrells demanded arbitration under the
Arbitration Clause of the insurance policy. The claim was arbitrated in November of2010 and an
award given. Ferrells filed a Petition for Confirmation of the arbitration award and requested
attorney fees and costs. An order was issued by the District Court awarding costs to the Ferrells
but not attorney fees. Upon reconsideration the Court again determined the Ferrells were not
entitled to attorney fees. Also, upon reconsideration, the Court reversed its decision regarding
costs and held that each party should bear their own costs in accordance with the arbitration
agreement between the parties.
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B. Procedural History
The Ferrells first notified United Financial of their wage loss through a letter dated July
9, 2009. R. p. 011. The Ferrells formally demanded payment of their wage loss claim and
provided documentation of their losses by letter dated December 22, 2009. R. p. 012.
United Financial tendered payment of the undisputed amount of wage loss on January 5,
2010. R. p. 014.
Without filing suit, the Ferrells demanded arbitration pursuant to the uninsured motorist
provision of their policy by letter dated January 22, 2010. R. p. 019.
The arbitration hearing was conducted on November 4, 2010. Each party had previously
designated their respective arbitrator and had jointly agreed on a third arbitrator. The arbitrators
awarded lost wages in favor of the Ferrells and specifically found that no lawsuit had been filed
prior to demanding arbitration. R. p. 020. United Financial sent payment in full per the award on
November 19, 2010 as provided for in Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion
to Reconsider. R. p. 148.
On January 3, 2011, United Financial filed a motion to stay the proceedings to allow the
Arbitration panel to address the issue of costs and fees. R. p. 021. The panel declined to address
the issue of costs and fees, and the Motion to Stay was withdrawn. R. p. 031.
United Financial filed its Answer to the Petition for Confirmation of Arbitration Award
and Award of Costs and Fees on February 17, 2011. R. p. 033.
The Ferrells filed a Motion for Fees and Costs on March 11, 2011. R. p. 040. United
Financial filed Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees and Costs on March 24,
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2011. R. p. 068. United Financial also filed the relevant portion of the insurance policy by
Affidavit of Defendants' Counsel on April 6, 2011. R. p. 088. The matter was heard before the
District Court on April6, 2011. Tr. Pp. 11-40. The court issued its Memorandum Decision and
Order Re: Motion for Fees and Costs in which it denied the F errells attorney fees, but, it did
award costs to the Ferrells. The decision failed to consider the insurance policy and ruled that
Rule 54 governed the costs. R. p. 107.
Both parties moved to reconsider and filed responding briefs and affidavits. R. pp. 12069. The court heard these motions on June 8, 2011. Tr. pp. 41-56. The District Court issued its
decision that the Ferrells were not entitled to attorney fees. R. pp. 179-83. The court further
reversed its previous award of costs because the insurance policy specifically designates that
each party should bear the burden of their respective costs and the policy was controlling on this
issue. R. pp. 183-84.
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

The District Court properly applied Idaho Code§ 41-1839 and the common law

in denying the Ferrells' request for attorney fees.
2.

The Ferrells should not be awarded costs because the controlling language is

found in the insurance policy.
3.

Ferrells' request for attorney fees and cost on appeal should be denied.
III.STANDARD OF REVIEW

This appeal for attorney fees is based on the application ofldaho Code§ 41-1839. The
interpretation of a statute is a question oflaw over which the court exercises free review.
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Harrison v. Binnion, 14 7 Idaho 645, 214 P .3d 631 (2009). It must begin with the literal words of

the statute. Thomson v. City ofLewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002).
The matter of reviewing an award of costs pursuant to arbitration requires the
interpretation of the Uniform Arbitration Act. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law
subject to free review. Harrison, 147 Idaho at 649, 214 P.3d at 635. The Uniform Arbitration Act
can be found in Title 7, chapter 9 of the Idaho Code. An evaluation of the statutes in question
must determine the literal words; those words must be given the plain, usual and ordinary
meaning. Id. If the language is not ambiguous, the court must simply follow the law. Id. (quoting
McLean v. Maverick Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006)).

IV.ARGUMENT
A. The District Court properly applied I.C. § 41-1839 in this action.
The District Court held that the Ferrells are not allowed to recover under I.C. § 41·1
as it existed at the time of arbitration. At the time the Ferrells initiated arbitration, § 41 ~ 1839
provided as follows:
ALLOWANCE OF ATTORNEY FEES IN SUITS AGAINST
INSURERS. (1) Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or
contract of insurance, surety, guaranty or indemnity of any kind or
nature whatsoever, which shall fail for a period of thirty (30) days
after proof of loss has been furnished as provided in such policy,
certificate or contract, to pay to the person entitled thereto the
amount justly due under such policy, certificate or contract, shall in
any action thereafter brought against the insurer in any court in this
state for recovery under the terms of the policy, certificate or
contract, pay such further amount as the court shall adjudge
reasonable as attorney's fees in such action.
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LC. § 41-1839(1) (emphasis added) (effective until July 1, 2010). As the Ferrells noted in their
brief, the statute was subsequently amended, and the revised statute became effective on July 1,
2010. Appellants' Brief p. 8 ("A. Brief'). This was six months after the Ferrells demanded
arbitration. The District Court recognized the amendment and the possible effect it would have
on this action in its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Fees and Costs. R. p. 109.
United Financial argued against the application of the amended statute and the District Court
agreed.
1. § 41-1839, as amended, cannot be retrospectively applied.

The Ferrells incorrectly claim that § 41-1839 should be applied retrospectively to this
action. The Ferrells appeal to public policy and the legislative statement of purpose in hopes that
they will sway the court. A. Brief p. 8-9, 11. However, both arguments fail to cite authority on
which they rely. More importantly, the statute and statement of purpose lacked retrospective
language or reference that the legislature intended the amended statute to apply retroactively.
United Financial argued against the application of the amended statute retrospectively.
support of this argument, United Financial offered Myers v. Vermaas, 114 Idaho 85, 753 P.2d
296 (Ct. App. 1988), as instructive on this issue. Tr. p. 26, L. 12-17. The District Court agreed
with United Financial and provided an extensive and persuasive analysis on why the amended
statute should not apply retrospectively. R. p. 110-12. The Court cited Myers, wherein the Idaho
Court of Appeals provided clarification regarding retrospective application of amended statutes
as follows:
Unless a contrary legislative intent appears on the face of a statute,
retrospective application is disfavored. I. C. § 73-101. See also
5- RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

University of Utah Ho~pital v. Pence, 104 Idaho 172, 657 P.2d 469
(1982). An application is deemed retrospective if it affects
substantive rights. City of Garden City v. City of Boise, 104 Idaho
512, 660 P.2d 1355 (1983). Among the rights characterized as
substantive are those which are "contractual or vested" in nature.
Id. at 515, 660 P.2d at 1358. Statutes which do not "create, enlarge,
diminish or destroy contractual or vested rights" are deemed to be
remedial or procedural, as opposed to substantive. !d. They may be
applied retrospectively.
When this classification scheme is applied to statutes authorizing
discretionary awards of attorney fees, such statutes generally are
held to be remedial or procedural. Consequently, they are given
retroactive effect. See, e.g., Idaho Fair Share v. Idaho Public
Utilities Commission, 113 Idaho 959, 751 P.2d 107 (1988)
(applying I.C. § 61-617A); Jensen v. Shank, 99 Idaho 565, 585
P.2d 1276 (1978) (applying I.C. § 12-121). Presumably, any
amendment to such statutes also would receive retrospective effect.
However, we think a different analysis is required for I.C. § 12120. Unlike I.C. §§ 12-121 and 61-617A, I.C. § 12-120 provides
for a mandatory, not discretionary, award of attorney fees to the
prevailing party in commercial litigation. The automatic nature of
an award under I.C. § 12-120 makes it, in effect, an adjunct to the
underlying commercial agreement between the parties. It
establishes an entitlement. In this respect, an award under the
statute is closely akin to other "contractual or vested" rights
contained in the agreement itself. Although the award right is
"remedial" in the semantic sense that it relates to a remedy, the
same could be said of contract provisions relating to damages or
other relief in the event of default.
Accordingly, we think that the 1986 amendment to I.C. § 12-120,
which enlarged the scope of entitlement to mandatory attorney fee
awards, is more accurately classified as substantive than as merely
remedial or procedural. Consequently, the 1986 amendment should
not be given retroactive effect.
!d. at 87, 753 P.2d at 298.
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In an Addendum on Petitions for Rehearing in Howard v. Blue Cross ofidaho Health

Service, Inc., 114 Idaho 485, 757 P.2d 1204 (Ct. App. 1987), the court of appeals stated the
following regarding its decision in Myers:
We also noted in Myers that a mandatory fee-shifting statute
produces a harsh result for the non-prevailing party whose claim or
defense is meritorious but unsuccessfuL Such a result can be
deemed fair only if the operation of the statute is known in
advance and the parties are able to guide their litigation
decisions accordingly. See DeWils Interiors, Inc. v. Dines, 106
Idaho 288, 293, 678 P.2d 80, 85 (Ct. App. 1984). We concluded in
Myers that "a retrospective application of the 1986 amendment to
I.C. § 12-120 would distort this decision-making process. It would
profoundly alter --after the fact-- the costs and benefits of
submitting a meritorious (albeit disputed) claim to the courts for
resolution."

!d. at 493-94,757 P.2d at 1212-13. (Emphasis added)
The court of appeals again discussed Myers in Eriksen v. Blue Cross ofIdaho Health

Services, Inc., 116 Idaho 693, 778 P.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1989). The court stated:
In Myers, we drew a line against application of I.C. § 12-120(3) to
suits filed prior to the 1986 amendment because the parties in such
cases had no opportunity to weigh the risk of exposure to
mandatory fee awards before deciding to litigate. That is not so
here. Although the insurance policy was issued prior to the 1986
amendment, the application of the attorney fee provision was
triggered only by the commencement of litigation after the
amendment had become effective. Thus, unlike the parties in
Myers, the parties in this case were aware of the attorney fee risk
when they chose to litigate. Moreover, we note that our Supreme
Court has adopted the risk-weighing rationale of Myers. See
Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228, 775 P.2d 120 (1989). We conclude
that an attorney fee award was authorized by LC. § 12-120(3) in
this case.

!d. at 695-96, 778 P .2d at 817-18.
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Myers and its progeny show that statutes authorizing mandatory awards of attorney's fees
are substantive in nature. Because § 12-120 "more closely resembles a substantive right than a
merely procedural right," the courts refused retrospective application. United Financial had a
meritorious defense because the arbitration award for wage loss was significantly less than the
Ferrells' demand. R. p. 12 (Demand Letter); R. p. 20 (Award Decision). Applying the reasoning
of Myers to this case; application of the law retrospectively would subject United Financial to a
harsh result when it had a proven meritorious defense.
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated the attorney fee provision of§ 41 183 9 is "not a
penalty but is an additional sum rendered as compensation when the insured is entitled to recover
under the insurance policy, 'to prevent the sum therein provided from being diminished by
expenditures for the services of an attorney .... "' Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138
Idaho 244,247,61 P.3d 601, 604 (2002). "[T]he provisions ofi.C. § 41-1839 become part ofthe
insurance contract to the same effect as though incorporated therein." Pendlebury v. Western

Casualty & Sur. Co., 89 Idaho 456, 406 P.2d 129 (1965). Section 41-1839(1) states the insurer
"shall" pay attorney's fees if specific conditions are met. Thus, the right to collect attorney's fees
under§ 41-1839(1) is analogous to other vested rights in the underlying contract. Section 411839(1) is similar to § 12-120 in that it mandates an attorney fee award rather than simply
authorizing a discretionary award. R. p. 112.
The Supreme Court found in Grease Spot, "there is no language indicating that § 41-1839
is meant to imply a provision for arbitration attorney fees into every insurance policy." Grease

Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 582, 226 P.3d 524,528 (2010). The amendment to§ 41-1839
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provided a substantive change to its prior version to include mandatory attorney fees in
arbitration.
The District Court properly concluded the entitlement to a mandatory award under § 411839(1) was a substantive right. This substantive right was found in both the original and
amended versions for lawsuits; however, the amended statute made attorney fees more broadly
available to include arbitration. The Court went on to say that:
The amendment did not change the right to collect attorney's fees
from discretionary to mandatory. As a result, this Court believes it
is appropriate to consider whether retrospective application would
be proper if "the operation of the statute [was] known in advance
and the parties [were] able to guide their litigation decisions
accordingly." Cf Howard, at 493-94, 757 P.2d at 1212-13. In other
words, if [United Financial] had the "opportunity to weigh the risk
of exposure to mandatory fee awards before deciding to
[arbitrate]," then retrospective application of § 41-1839 may be
proper. Cf Eriksen, 116 Idaho at 695-96, 778 P.2d at 817-18.
R. p. 112.
The application of respective mandatory attorney fees under § 41-1839 in arbitration
alters a substantive right. The statute should not be used to award attorney fees in this case
because United Financial did not have a fair opportunity to weigh the risk of exposure to
mandatory fee awards in arbitration before deciding to arbitrate.
2. Filing suit prior to arbitration was required for§ 41-1839 to apply to this
action.
For § 41-1839 to apply to this action, the Ferrells were required to file suit prior to
arbitration. The District Court agreed and provided support through a valid and thorough analysis
of Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244, 61 P.4d 601 (2002) and Barbee v.
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WMA Securities, Inc., 143 Idaho 391, 146 P.3d 657 (2006). R. p. 113-15. The Court properly
recognized that Barbee was the more recent precedent, that it more directly analyzed the
applicable issues, and that it was controlling for purposes of the Court's decision.
The Ferrells apparently like the language in Martin and do not like the language in

Barbee. So the Ferrells request that this Court rely on the older, less on-point, and noncontrolling case language. To make such argument, the Ferrells assert that Martin has never
been formally overruled.
Once again, the District Court appropriately addressed the Ferrells' position in its
decisions. For clarification on the issue, the language found in Barbee does explicitly reference

Martin and refutes the Ferrells' argument. According to Barbee:
The issue of whether this statute supports a suit solely for attorney
fees filed after an arbitration award assigning damages has been
fully paid is a matter of first impression for Idaho courts. For
guidance, the parties refer this Court to many cases involving I.C.
§ 41-1839, a somewhat analogous statute that allows a claimant to
recover attorney fees under certain circumstances in suits against
insurers. See Emery v. United P. Ins. Co., 120 Idaho 244, 815 P.2d
442 (1991); Wolfe [v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co.], 128 Idaho 398, 913
P.2d 1168 [1996]; Martin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.
Co., 138 Idaho 244, 61 P.3d 601 (2002); American Foreign Ins.
Co. v. Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 94 P .3d 699 (2004). While the
Bentleys [plaintiffs] argue these cases indicate a party may bring a
separate lawsuit after arbitration simply to recover attorney fees,
we are not persuaded. The common thread flowing through these
cases is that attorney fees were awarded where the insured was
involved in a lawsuit before he or she received the amount justly
due-their damages-from the insurance company. Here, WMA
timely paid the arbitration award. The Bentleys were not involved
in a lawsuit before they received their damages from WMA.
Consequently, to the extent cases interpreting I.C. § 41-1839 apply
by analogy, the Bentleys are not entitled to file a separate lawsuit
solely for attorney fees.
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Furthermore, a fair reading of I.C. § 60-1446 indicates there is no
independent cause of action for attorney tees. Under the statute, a
claimant is entitled to sue for consideration paid, together with
interest, costs and tees. There is no basis tor simply filing a lawsuit
to collect attorney fees when the principal amount claimed has
been fully paid and resolved in another proceeding.
146 P.3d at 661 (italics in original; underlined emphasis added; bracketed language added to
complete citations and to identify party status).
Stated simply, the Barbee court recognized that Emery, Wolfe, Martin, and American
Foreign Insurance together indicate that a previous lawsuit to pursue the underlying claim tor

damages was a critical requirement for a subsequent request for attorney fees. 146 P.3d at 66L
And since WMA in Barbee "timely paid the arbitration award," the plaintiffs were "not entitled
to file a separate lawsuit solely for attorney fees." !d. In the present case, unlike in Barbee, the
cases "interpreting I. C. § 41-183 9" need not be applied "by analogy"-rather direct application
of those cases based on the same statutory provision is appropriate. !d.
The Ferrells' arguments are flawed: While there may not be an express statement that
says "Martin is hereby overruled," that portion of Martin that is now relied on by the Ferrells has
been discussed and refuted by a subsequent Idaho Supreme Court ruling. Accordingly, it is no
longer valid law, it is not binding, and it demonstrates that the District Court was correct in its
initial ruling.
In addition to Barbee, the Grease Spot decision went even further in its rejection of the
Ferrells' Martin-based arguments. Grease Spot, 226 P.3d at 526-30. The District Court initially
found it unnecessary to address Grease Spot at any length stating: "Even if this Court ignores
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Grease Spot, under the Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of pre-amended § 41-1839 as stated

in Barbee, [United Financial] would not have been subject to the mandatory fee provision of§
41-1839 for fees incurred in arbitration." R. p. 115 (brackets added to properly name
Respondent). Nevertheless, it is evident that Grease Spot reinforces the conclusion that the
referenced language from Martin cannot be relied on. Grease Spot states as follows:
[T]he plain text of I. C. § 41-183 9 is at odds with this Court's prior
readings of the statute. Section 41-1839 only permits insureds to
collect attorney fees incurred in a civil "action" to recover under an
insurance policy. When a court compels arbitration, it often stays
litigation as to all parties, regardless of whether they are to
participate in the arbitration, to allow these corollary proceedings
to be completed. An arbitration is not part of a civil action, but
rather a proceeding separate and apart from litigation based on a
contract between the parties. Further, there is no language
indicating that § 41-1839 is meant to imply a provision for
arbitration attorney fees into every insurance policy. Emery was
therefore manifestly incorrect in holding to the contrary. To the
extent that Emery implied into insurance policies a provision
granting insureds arbitration attorney fees, it is expressly
overruled.
226 P.3d at 528 (see also Wo?fe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398,405,913 P.2d 1168,
1175 (1996) ("before an insured can recover attorney fees under the statute [LC. § 41 1839], an
action in court must be brought to recover under the terms of the insurance policy"). Simply
stated, even if Martin survived Barbee, the Supreme Court's unequivocal statements in Grease
Spot demonstrate that Martin is not controlling law on this issue.

The District Court properly denied attorney fees because the Barbee analysis replaced
Martin. The District Court properly recognizing that Barbee is more recent, addresses the issue

more directly, and is the relevant and controlling precedent.
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3. The Ferrells misconstrue Unity Light & Power and Diace/ Chemical.
The Ferrells' brief disregards the factual case contexts when it pulls language from Unity
Light & Power v. Burley, 92 Idaho 499, 445 P.2d 720 (1968); and State ex Ref Wasden v. Diacel
Chemical Industries, 141 Idaho 102, 106 P.3d 428, (2005). A. Brief p. 11-13. The Ferrells
attempt to use limited language from these cases to argue that this Court should apply§ 41-1839
as such existed in November 2010 (i.e., when the Ferrells filed a request with the District Court
to confirm the arbitration award). Significantly however, neither Unity Light & Power, nor
Diacel Chemical involved arbitration. See Unity Light & Power, 92 Idaho at 501 ("Unity
instituted the present action ... "; text search shows no reference to arbitration); Diacel Chemical,
141 Idaho at 104 ("On January 6, 2003, the State filed this action ... "; text search shows no
reference to arbitration). Because there was no arbitration involved in these cases, when the
Supreme Court made pronouncements about what was controlling law, it did so in the context of
state court litigation being the only forum and proceeding.
It is an immense stretch of the statements and rationale found in Unity Light & Power and
in Diacel Chemical for the Ferrells to now argue that their own initiation of arbitration, and
indeed the whole arbitration process, should be disregarded in considering the controlling law. If
courts accepted such rationale, it would create considerable confusion and preclude a defendant
from understanding what law would ultimately control a pending dispute.
The District Court appropriately considered and applied the rulings of Unity Light &
Power and Diacel Chemical. Those decisions stand for the principle that the law existing at the
commencement of an action should be controlling throughout the course of the proceeding. R. p.
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180. United Financial agrees and again asserts that the proceeding commenced when arbitration
was initiated.
The Ferrells' brief also cites Overman v. Overman, 102 Idaho 235,629 P.2d 127 (1980).
A. Briefp. 12. Overman is a divorce/child custody case. United Financial is unable to determine
the relevance or why such case is being cited. According to the Overman court:
The question presented by this appeal is a narrow one, i.e., whether
the district court, on the non-custodial parent's motion to modify
the child custody decree, erred in entering an order granting
temporary custody of the minor children to the non-custodial
parent upon a properly supported ex parte motion pending a full
hearing, to be held within ten days.
102 Idaho at 237, 629 P.2d at 129. United Financial has not found language in Overman that
seems to pertain to the present matter (there is no page-specific reference in the cite included
the Ferrells' briefing). Accordingly, United Financial does not believe that Overman has
applicability or that it supports the Ferrells' arguments.

4. The Ferrells' request to confirm an arbitration award is not an action in
court sufficient to recover attorney fees under§ 41-1839.
The Ferrells' action before the District Court was allegedly to "confirm the arbitration
award." However, the Ferrells' pleadings and motions have obviously focused on pursuing
attorney fees. The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that a post-arbitration request to
confirm an award does not suffice as a basis to recover attorney fees under LC. § 41-1839~
In Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398, 913 P.2d 1168 (1996), the court
explains and rules as follows:
Wolfe argues that he is entitled to attorney fees incurred during
arbitration under his motion to the district court for confirmation of
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the arbitration award. Wolfe contends that when an insured is
required to enter into arbitration under his insurance contract, due
to his insurance company's failure to pay what is justly due, then
he is entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 41-1839. Wolfe
cites Emery and Walton v Hartford Ins. Co., 120 Idaho 616, 818
P.2d 320 (1991), as authority for his argument. We disagree with
Wolfe's assertions. Neither Emery nor Walton is helpful or
instructive to the resolution of the present case.
Idaho Code 41-1839 provides for the award of attorney fees if the
insurance company fails to pay an amount justly due under the
policy within thirty days after proof of loss. But, before an insured
can recover attorney fees under the statute, an action in court must
be brought to recover under the terms of the insurance policy. I. C.
§ 41-1839; see Pendlebury v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 89
Idaho 456, 465, 406 P.2d 129, 134 (1965) ("An insurer which fails
for a period of thirty days after proof of loss to pay the person
entitled thereto the amount justly due under the policy, shall in any
action thereafter pay such further amount as the court shall adjudge
reasonable as attorney's fees in such action."). In both Emery and
Walton, suits were filed in court prior to arbitration, which brought
those cases squarely within the purview of I.C. § 41-1839. In the
present case, a motion for confirmation of an arbitration award is
being used as a vehicle to assert a claim for attorney fees where no
prior court action was filed.
No Idaho Supreme Court case has previously addressed the issue
of whether a motion for confirmation of an arbitration award
constitutes an action in court to recover attorney fees incurred in
arbitration under I.C. § 41-1839 ....

***
On its face Idaho Code§ 41-1839 requires that an action in court
be filed. The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that "[t]here
shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action."' I.R.C.P.
2; see also Idaho Const. art. V, § 1. Rule 3(a) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure requires that a civil action commence with the
filing of a complaint, petition, or application with the court and
that no dispute may be submitted to the court without the filing of
a complaint, petition, or application. I.R.C.P. 3(a). A confirmation
application is presented to the court through a motion or
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application for the purpose of confirming an arbitration award. An
application seeking the confirmation of an arbitration award is not
an action in court to recover attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 411839. Wolfe filed a motion for confirmation of arbitration award,
pursuant to I. C. § 7-911, seeking attorney fees. Because the
confirmation motion is not an action in court pursuant to I. C. § 411839, Wolfe is not entitled to attorney fees.
128 Idaho at 403-04, 405, 913 P.2d at 1173-74, 1175 (underlined emphasis added).
In addition to strengthening the other arguments asserted by United Financial, Wo(fe
makes it clear that the Ferrells have no basis to obtain attorney fees via a post-arbitration
proceeding that is only being brought to "confirm" the arbitration award. Since this is exactly
what the Ferrells are attempting to do, this Court should sustain both of the District Court's
rulings and again deny any award of attorney fees in accordance with Wo(fe. R. pp. 107 and 177.
5. Because United Financial has already paid the arbitration award, the
present proceeding is moot.
There is another issue that becomes evident in reviewing the cases cited by both parties
and previously relied on by the Court: This proceeding is moot because United Financial acted
promptly to pay the arbitration award soon after such was issued. R. p. 148. Idaho courts have
stated that confirmation of an arbitration award is only needed if it is necessary to convert such
to a judgment for future collection efforts. See Bingham County Com 'n v. Interstate Elec. Co.,
108 Idaho 181, 183, 697 P.2d 1195, 1197 (Idaho App. 1985)("Such an award requires the
imprimatur of a court to be enforced."). Here the award is already paid-meaning that a
judgment is unnecessary, confirmation is meaningless, and this proceeding is therefore moot.

Barbee is again instructive:
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Here, WMA timely paid the arbitration award [WMA was
the party against whom the arbitration award was issued].
The Bentleys [the plaintiffs] were not involved in a lawsuit
before they received their damages from WMA.
Consequently, to the extent cases interpreting LC. § 411839 apply by analogy, the Bentleys are not entitled to file
a separate lawsuit solely for attorney fees.
146 P.3d at 661 (bracketed language added to identify the involved entities).
In the present case, United Financial acted promptly to pay the full amount of the
arbitration award. Checks were immediately requested, timely processed, and United Financial's
counsel forwarded such on November 19, 2010 (only two weeks after the award was issued). R.
p. 151-54. Notwithstanding this prompt timing, and with the understanding that checks were
being issued, the Ferrells submitted their initial Petition with the District Court on November 16,
2010 (however, the Petition was received by United Financial's counsel after payment was
issued and received by the Ferrells). R. p. 149.
Because United Financial "timely paid the arbitration award," the Ferrells need not have
been "involved in a lawsuit before they received their damages." Barbee, 146 P.3d at 661.
Hence, the Ferrells' lawsuit effectively seeking "solely attorney fees" is unnecessary and moot

I d.
B. The District Court properly overturned its previous award of costs.
1. The Ferrells' incorrectly focus on rule 54 as determinative.

The Ferrells' brief asserts that LR.C.P. Rule 54 is controlling. A. Briefp. 17-19.
However, courts in Idaho and elsewhere have made it clear that such a civil rule provision will
not override the parties' arbitration agreement or the provisions ofthe Uniform Arbitration Act
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LC. §§ 7-901 through 7-922. Because the arbitration agreement and the UAA do not warrant the
shifting of costs, the focus on Civil Rule 54 is unhelpful.
For example, in 2010, the Idaho Supreme Court favorably cited a New Jersey case which
addressed the interaction between arbitration and civil rule cost shifting provisions. The New
Jersey case stated as follows:
This court holds that the provisions of R. 4:42-8 [New Jersey civil
rule] providing for an award of costs in favor of a prevailing party
are not intended to apply to proceedings resolved through the
confirmation of an arbitrator's award arising out of mandatory
non-binding arbitration conducted pursuant to R. 4:21A-1, unless
such a claim is specifically preserved in the arbitrator's award.
See Greenfield v. Caesar's Atlantic City Hotel/Casino, 334 N.J. Super. 149, 756 A.2d 1096,

1102 (Law Div. 2000) (underlined emphasis added; bracketed explanatory language added)
(cited in Grease Spot. The Idaho Supreme Court ruled in Grease Spot: "a general fee-shifting

statute did not control over the specific UAA provision." !d. 226 P.3d at 529. (citing Canon Sch.
Dist. No. 50 v. W.E.S. Canst. Co., 180 Ariz. 148, 882 P.2d 1274, 1279-80 (1994)).

Pursuant to this case law, the applicable statute is the Uniform Arbitration Act, the
controlling document is the parties' arbitration agreement, and Civil Rule 54 does not preempt
these provisions. The UAA simply requires deference to an existing arbitration agreement. This
Court should therefore recognize and defer to the cost provision contained in the arbitration
agreement. The relevant portion of the insurance policy provides:
"Each party will pay the costs and fees of its arbitrator and any
other expenses it incurs. The costs and fees of the third arbitrator
will be shared equally."
R. p. 097.
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The Ferrells' brief attempts to limit the application of the Grease Spot decision by
arguing that this case was decided after arbitration began and was overruled by statute. A. Brief
p. 19. The brief then cites Emery and § 41-1839 as the relevant authority and that their arguments
regarding attorney fees should be analogously applied to Rule 54. A. Brief p. 19. However, the
law regarding costs was the same at the time the Ferrells demanded arbitration and when they
filed suit. The Arbitration Clause of the insurance policy was ever present and the UAA was in
force during all relevant times. While Grease Spot has been limited in the application of attorney
fees in arbitration, the legislature did not amend § 41-1839 to include costs or overturn Grease

Spot as a whole. See§ 41-1839(1)(as effective July 1, 2010). Grease Spot provided clarity to
law regarding costs as it existed before and after the commencement of these proceedings. 226
P.3d at 529.
The Ferrells' reliance on Civil Rule 54 is misplaced because of the UAA, the favorable
case law, and the explicit language in the Arbitration Clause. Accordingly, there was no
"waiver" of any objection pursuant to Rule 54 because that rule is not controlling. Similarly,
discussion of"prevailing party" is unhelpful because of the explicit contractual arbitration
document. Accordingly, the District Court properly determined that the parties are to bear
own cost.

2. The Arbitration Clause contained in the policy was exercised by the
Ferrells and is controlling.
The Ferrells initiated this proceeding to confirm an arbitration award. R. p. 006. The
award arose from the parties' previously existing agreement to apply the Arbitration Clause of
the insurance policy. The Ferrells filed their Petition in the District Court citing the Arbitration
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Clause. R. p. 008, L. 15-16. The Ferrells went even further in referencing the UAA as the
statutory framework under which their action arose. R. p. 009, L. 18-19. The Ferrells conceded
that the Arbitration Clause provided the procedures and relief they were seeking to confirm.
However, the Ferrells did not provide the District Court with a copy of the insurance policy with
the Arbitration Clause.
Furthermore, when the Ferrells filed their Motion for Fees and Costs, they did not cite the
Arbitration Clause as the authority governing reliefbecause it did not grant them all of the costs
they were requesting. R. p. 040. Subsequently, the Ferrells asked the District Court to disregard
the Arbitration Clause because they believed Rule 54 should be the authority regarding costs.
p. 156. The underlying arbitration agreement was provided to the Court and was relied on by
United Financial's counsel at the initial hearing. R. p. 088; Tr. p. 33, L. 8-16. There was no
objection raised by the Ferrells' counsel when such was submitted, and the District Court
indicated that such would be considered in its decision. Tr. p. 39, L. 16-20. The Ferrelk'
that they objected to the court considering the Arbitration Clause by citing a discussion held
the record. A. Briefp. 18, footnote 2.
The Ferrells were afforded an opportunity to file an objection to the submission and
consideration of the Arbitration Clause. Tr. p. 39, L. 25; p. 40, L. 1-2. They filed their Objection
to Affidavit of Defendants' Counsel on April 11, 2011. R. p. 098. This filing and all subsequent
filings, including the Ferrells' Appellant's Brief, object to the timeliness of bringing the
Arbitration Clause to the District Courts attention, and not whether it is the binding authority.
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When the issue of costs was being reconsidered by the District Court, the Ferrells had
opportunity to present their objections to the application of the Arbitration Clause. Again, the
Ferrells relied on Rule 54 as a shield against the Arbitration Clause. Tr. p. 48, L. 4-19.
The District Court determined that§ 7-910 provides the necessary instruction:
"Unless otherwise provided in the agreement to arbitrate, the
arbitrators' expenses and fees, together with other expenses, not
including counsel fees, incurred in the conduct of the arbitration,
shall be paid as provided in the award."

R. p. 184 (Emphasis added). The District Court's ruling denying costs was correct because the
statute clearly provides that the Arbitration Clause properly controls the issue of costs.
The Ferrells have benefitted from the Arbitration Clause. Based on such, they obtained an
award which has been paid. Accordingly, the Ferrells ought to be subject to all of the provisions
specified in the agreement. As cited above, this means that costs cannot be shifted to the V'""'""'
Financial. This Court should uphold the District Court's ruling regarding costs to accord with
the parties' arbitration agreement, the Uniform Arbitration Act, and the cited case law.
C. Attorney fees and cost on appeal.

The Ferrells have requested attorney fees and costs on appeal in their brief. A. Brief p.19.
The same arguments expressed above apply equally to the Ferrel]s' request for attorney fees on
appeal.
Furthermore, Rule 35(a)(5) of the Idaho Appellate Rules states:
Attorney Fees on AppeaL If the appellant is claiming attorney fees
on appeal the appellant must so indicate in the division of issues
on appeal that appellant is claiming attorney fees and state the
basis for the claim. (emphasis added)
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The Ferrells' brief does have a section listed as issues on appeal. A. Brief p. 7. This
section regarding issues on appeal does not include a request for attorney fees on appeal as
required by the above rule. The Ferrells' request for attorney fees on appeal should be denied
because they have failed to properly plead their requests under Rule 35(a)(5) of the Idaho
Appellate Rules. United Financial requests the Ferrells' request for attorney fees and costs
appeal be denied.

V. CONCLUSION
According to the foregoing arguments, This Court should hold that the District Court
properly determined that the Ferrells are not entitled to attorney fees under§ 41-1839 and the
parties are to bear the burden of their own costs pursuant to Arbitration Clause of the insurance
policy.

DATED thisdJday of March 2012.

LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A.
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